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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
\VAYXJ1~

J.A.Cl(SON and
JACKSON, his wife,

~1ILDRED

Plaintiffs and App·ellees,

vs.
\

Case No.

H. T. COPE and T. TRU1fAN COPE,
Co-partners, doing business under
· the fir1n na1ne and style of Cope
Brothers Lumber Co.,

8012

Defendants and App·ella.nts.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

The plaintiffs instituted this suit in the District
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake
County, l~tah, alleging that they suffered damages in
the ~Ulli of $700.00 by reason of defendants' negligence
in exe~uting a lien \\"aiver to plaintiffs' contractor in
exchange for a ehec·k in that an1ount paid hy the said
l'ontl'actul· on hi~ account for lu1nber and other building

3
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materials purchased by hiu1 frorn the defendants. After
a trial before the· Court sitting without a jury, judg1nent
was . rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the above
arnount, plus interest (R. ·71, 72, 73, & 74).

STATE1IENT O·F FACTS
On the 27th day of July, 1950, the plaintiffs entered
into a written agreement with one J. H. Hohnes whereby
the latter as ~ontra.ctor, agreed to construct a five roo1n
horne for the pl~iiitiffs on property located at 1777 East
21st South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit ·B, R. 35 _& 36). The plaintiffs thereafter negoti·ated a construction loan with Union r_rrust Co1npany, and
signed a promissory note and ·Inortgage securing the loan
of $9,050.00. (D:efendants' Exhibit 1, R-. 41). r:rhe plaintiffs
authorized the loaning institution to discharge funds
. from. their account directly to Hohnes upon presentation
by him of lien waiv~rs from the various laborers and
materialinen with whom he ~as doing business. (Defendants' Exhibit 1, R. 40, 41, 42 & 44).
The defendants h~ve been engaged as partners for
t~e past five or six yeats doing business under the finn
n~1ne of C?·pe Brothers Lu1nber Cornpany, and have sold
and delivered quantities of lurnber and other building
1naterials to plaintiffs' contractor liohnes, \vho, prior
to his bankruptcy in 1951, \Vas construeting dwelling
houses in and around Salt Lake l~ity, lTtah (It 46, -t-7,
63 & 64).
4
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Holmes conunenced construction of the phtintiffs'
d'velling in the late Sununer or early Fall of 1950 (R.
43). He w·as at that tin1e in the course of constructing
~everal other residences, and this fact was known to
.both plaintiffs and defendants (R. 46 & 64).
On October :27, 1950, Hohnes issued a check from
his construction co1npany in the sun1· of $700.00, payable
to Cope Brothers Llunber Con1pany, and sent it to them
by n1ail (R. 33 & 34). Accompanying this check was a
form lien waiver, in blank. Defendant H. T. Cope filled
in the date of receipt, the an1ount, signed the partnership name by hiinself, and returned it to Holmes, as the
contractor (R. 33 & 34). At this time, Holmes was
indebted to the defendants in excess of $3900.00 for lum""
her and other n1aterials sold and delivered to him on
open account (R. 34 & 35). It had been a business
practice for defendants to deliver lumber and other
building 1naterials to employees of Holmes, who would
place the orders in advance, call for the merchandise
at defendants' place of business, and haul it by trucks
to a warehouse Iuaintained by Holmes, for later distribution to a particular job (R. 63 & 64). The defendants
had no \Yay of knowing where the materials sold to
I-Iohnes went, other than to his warehouse, as most of
the 1nerchandise purchased from defendants was picked
up at their place· of business ( R. 39, 63' & 64).
After Holmes received. the above mentioned lien
waiver frorn the defendants, he co1npleted the form by
typing in the plaintiffs' job location and on N ove1nber 3,
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1950, presented the co1npleted lien waiver to the l~ nion
Trust Co1npany and received a check from it in the sun1
of $700.00, the amount which he had previously paid to
the defendants' lumber co1npany (R. ·41 and Plaintiffs'
Exhibit A).

In January, 1951, Fioln1es beca1ne financially
inyolved and, filed for relief in bankruptcy (R,. 48 & 49).
The plaintiffs' dwelling had not been con1pleted and
there were 1ne~hanic's liens against the property aggre~ating about $1100.00 (I-t. ·44, 45 & 46). Plaintiffs had
not required Holmes to furnish a bond, as provided by
law (R. 50), and they were obliged to e1nploy another
c-ontractor t.o con1plete their job (I( 49, 60 & 61).
The plaintiffs then brought this action seeking to
recover the $700.00 which· Fiohnes h~d paid to the defendants' Co1npany, asserting that defendants were negligent in executing the lien waiver· requested by Hohnes.
The plaintiffs further clai1ned that defendants had furnished no material.s to their job. The evidence in this
latter respect is vague and not supported by the record
(R. 37, 56, 57 & 58). At the conclusion of the plaintiff~'
evidence, counsel for defendants 1noved the Court for
a judgment of no cause of. action on the ground that
plaintiffs had failed, as a 1natter of law, to prove a case
against the defendants upon their theor)r of negligence
(R. 59). The trial Court suggested that this ('ase should
have been pleaded upon a theory of assuu1p~it for n1oney
had and. reeeived, and over the objection of defendant~·
counsel, a1nended the pre-trjal order to in<·ot'}>Orate thil"
entirely ne'v theory (R. 60).

6
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S'l,_._-\TE~fENT

OF POINTS

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER.
ING FINDING OF FACT NO.6 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
DEFENDANTS DID NOT FURNISH ANY MATERIAL OR.
RENDER ANY SERVICE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
PLAINTIFFS' HOME ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE
REASON THAT SAID FINDING IS WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
'

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT NO. 7 TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE DEFENDANTS RECEIVED THE SUM OF $700.00
FROM FUNDS BELONGING TO PLAINTIFFS FOR WHICH
DEFENDANTS FURNISHED NO MATERIAL ON THE
GROUND AND FOR THE REASON THAT SAID FINDING
IS WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

POINT III
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

POINT IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE
PRE-TRIAL ORDER AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFFS' CASE ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE REASON
rrHAT SUCI-I AMENDMENT CREATED AN ENTIRELY NEW
THEORY OF THE CASE AND WAS FATAL TO PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION.

';7
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL_ COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDtNG OF FACT NO.6 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
DE;FENDANTS DID NOT FURNISH ANY MATERIAL OR
RENDER ANY SERVICE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
PLAINTIFFS' HOME ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE
REASON THAT SAID FINDING IS WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT NO. 7 TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE. DEFENDANTS RECEIVED THE SUl\i OF $700.00
FROM FUNDS BELONGING TO PLAINTIFFS FOR WHICH
DEFENDANTS ·FURNISHED NO MATERIAL ON THE
GROUND AND FOR THE REASON THAT SAID FINDING
IS WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The only evidence before the Court regarding
whether or not defendants' lu1nber co1npany had furnished any materials for use. in the construction of
plaintiffs' dwelling is conjectural and vague in nature,
and certainly insufficient to justify the findings n1ade
by the trial Court. Plaintiff Wayne J-ackson in testifying concerning this rna tter, said ( R. 37) :
By Mr. Bayle on voir dire: Hj\[r.Jackson,
what is the basis for your answer ~'yes" to that
question~

A.

Well, I understand the question to hP ye~~ I
know that Cope Brother~ Lun1her Cou1puny
didn't furni~h any lun1l>er in 111~? hou~t'.
8
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Q. 'Vhat is the basis of your knowledge 1
. A..

Well, l\fill Creek Lun1ber has a lien on my
place for about seventeen hundred and son1e
odd dollars which we have established the
fart that that's all the lumber that could have
been in there up to that point when John
Holmes took out bankruptcy.

Q. ..A. re you fa1niliar with how much lumber as
a matter of personal knowledge would go
into a home the size of yours 1
.A..

Only "~hat I have learned from building that
house and my contract with builders.

Q. You are not a building contractor, are you 1

A. No.
Q. And you can't figure the number of board
feet of the various types of lumber if you
are given the square footage of a house, can
you1

A. No."
This witness further testified that he had a. conversation with one of the defendants, H. T. Cope, in the
latter part of April, 1952, which was more than a year
after plaintiffs' contractor had h~ft their job (R. 38 &
39). Defendant Cope told this plaintiff that his company
had not actually hauled materials to plaintiff's address
but that lumber had been delivered to, Holmes's warehou~e during the time he was working on plaintiffs'
<lwelling, and that it could have gone anywhere from
there (R. 39) .
Nor does the testirnony of \vitness T£dwin S. Felt,

9
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Jr., assist the plaintiffs in proving that none of the
n1aterials furnished by defendants to Holmes went into
plaintiffs' ho1ne. :B_,elt testified that as credit rnanager
for Mill Creek Lurnber and Hardware Cornpany he \vas
fa1niliar with the fact that his co1npany had delivered
rnaterials in the amount of $2329.96 (R. 52 & 55), to
plaintiffs' address. This infor1nation \vas gleaned frorn
an .exainination of delivei·y tickets, but as to whether
these rnaterials actually went into plaintiffs' horne w·as
pure speculation insofar as this witness kne"r, for on
cross-exrunination he testified as follows (R. 56.) :
By Mr. Bayle: "Did you make an inspection
of the job in January of 1951 ~

A.

Yes. You rnight call it inspection. We certainly looked at the job. We didn't try and
. take an inventory.

Q. You don't know at that tirne that the lurnber
that was delivered to the site was actually
in the job, do you~

A.

Not piece for piece. I will put it that way.

Q. You rnade. no inspection on that basis;!
A.

Not as an inventory basis.

Q.

There cou'ld have been other u1aterials of
the type that con1e frorn a lurnber yard thnt
could have gone in the job, and son1e of your
materials could have gone sorne place else.
Is that correct~

.:\.

That i~ a possibility. \Ye had no iudicati<,n
actually, you kno,,·, of that happenin~, hut l
certainly· \vould ~ay it ,,·as \\' i thin the reahu
of possibility.
·
10
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Q. And did you kno\v at that time that Mr.
Hohnes \vas constructing several houses~
.A..

Oh, yes.
_-homes.

''T e

had furnished several of his

Q. ....-\nd they were all going on shnultaneously, ·
weren't they~
.A...

~\. g~ood

nun1ber of thein were."

This \Yitness ·produced none of the delivery tickets
at the trial and his testi1nony can shed little light on
the question in issue as upon further cross-examination
he proved that he did not know exactly what materials
had been furnished (R. 57 & 58).
By ~Ir. Bayle: "It is possible that you didn't
furnish the actual flooring. Is that correct~
A.

That would be an item that could be very
definitely ascertained. I don't have it right
in- n1y kno,vledge now of positively one· way
or another.

Q.. How about the
A.

siding~

That I would -want to refer to the tickets to
give a positive answer.

Q. What about the plaster

board~

A.

I would have to look at my tickets for that,
s1r.

Q.

You don't kno\v about those itenis?

A.

Not for certain."

vVitne~~

F elt also testified that the Inaterials that
would co111e frou1 a ltunher yard to- construct a home
1

11
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silnilar in size to that of plaintiffs would approxiinate
three thousand
dol"between twenty-five hundred and
.
.
lars" (R. 54). This was based upon a "fair esti1nate,"
to use the words of the witness (R. 54), and would have
no probative value when compared to the conclusion
drawn by defendant H. T. Cope who had actually been
engaged in the construction of houses. \Vitness Cope·s
testimony was that n1aterials furnished by a lumber
company would ·run about 40% of the total construction
cost of a residence such as the plain tiffs were building
(R. 65), and this would be far in excess of the an1ounts
clai1ned by plaintiffs to have been furnished by ~Iill
Creek Lurnher and Hardware Co1npany and that purchased by the second contractor (R. 60 & 61).
While "\Ve do not wish to burden this Court with
too minute of an interpretation of the foregoing evidence,
we do feel that the conclusions of the Court with respect
to these findings rest upon speculative evidence 'vhich
is too vague to justify the conclusion that none of defendants' materials went into plaintiffs' dwelling. \Ve there. fore respectfully urge this Co:urt to reject the trial
Court's findings in this respect as being unsupported
by the evidence.

POINT III
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPOR'l' THE
CO·l~CLUSIONS O:F' LAW, AND THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

12
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' re believe the essential question to be disposed of
on this appeal is "'"hether or not the Judgment entered
bv. the trial Court is contrarY
. to the law.
This is not a case 'vhere the defendants are attempting to. assert a lien upon plaintiffs' property for materials furnished, but conversely, plaintiffs attempt , to
recover 1noney which was paid to their c·ontractor in
exchange for a lien 'vaiver theretofore signed by defendants and delivered by then1 to the contractor upon receiv~
ing a payrnent upon his account. The question involves
Title 38-1-3, l~tah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides
as follows:
"Contractors, subcontractors and all persons
performing labor upon, or furnishing materials
to. be used in, the construction or alteration of,
or addition to, or repairs of, any building, structure or i1nprovement upon land; all foundry men
and boiler makers; all persons performing labor
or furnishing materials for the construction,
repairing or carrying on of any mill, manufactory
or hoisting works; all persons who shall do work
or furnish materials for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit~
and licensed architects and engineers and artisans
'vho have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps,
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered
other like professional service, or bestowed. labor,
shall have a lien upon the property upon or roncerniHg which they have rendered service, perforined labor or furnished rnaterials, for the value
of the service rendered, labor perfor1ned oi'"

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

f~-·:-··

.-,:materials furnished by each respectively, \vhether
_·at. the-- instance of the: owner or of any other person acting by- his authority as agent, contractor
:or otherwis'e. Such liens shall attach only to such
. -~,,:J:
i,l1t~rest as the owner 1nay have in the property,
..
but the interest of_ a lessee of a 1nining claiin, 1nine
. ·· · _· . or deposit~ whether working under bond or other..... - .-" ~·. -j~'.wise, shall for the purposes
this chapter include
·products mined and excavated while the same
rerna1n upon the preinises included within the

of

letise.~'

Had the defendants sought to enforce a lien upon
plaintiffs' property, they vvould have merely been
required to show by. a preponde~ance of evidence that
they had sold lumber and building materials to plaintif.~s' contrac-tor Hohnes, for use in their dwelling. It is
not neces~ary. that the inaterialinan actually deliver the
goods _ _sold ~6 the job. He can sell directly over the
counter to the contractor and still. enforce a lien upon
the pre1nises where the contractor intends to use then1
even though such goods are diverted by the contractor
to another job. · As the Court said in Westinghouse
·Electric Sup-ply (jomp·arvy vs. Hawthorne, 150 P. 2d

55, 58:

:~'.J.) : · ·
1

"A portion of the wire furnished was stored
for future use as needed, but this does not prevent
: ~ppellant frpin claiining a lien therefor. ~lateri.als
: which· are delivered· in good faith by a InatenalInari, to
incorpoi·ated into a building, arP lien. a'ble,_· arid the fact ~,_that they have not been u~Pd
for the purpose for which ordered \\·ill not defPat
-· the cia~m.''

be

14
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\\r e believe the rule stated in Jones on Liens, 3rd
Edition, paragraph 13:29, page 557, is practical when
applied to 1nodern business, and is applicable here:

Hin 1nost states, the actual use of the rnaterials
is not requisite if they 'vere furnished for a particular building or. in1provement. To require
direct and positive testhnony that as to each
specific article delivered, that it was in fact used
in the building, would 1nake the mechanics' lien
law Inore of a burden and a trap than a blessing
and a help."

It must be reiue1nbered that in the instant case, the
plaintiffs atte1npt to recover rnoney paid to defendants
by plaintiffs' contractor. The Utah lien statute above
quoted, merely gives the person who furnishes materials
to a contractor, an addition right in the form of a re.medy
against the owner of property where the materials are
intended for use. By waiving this right, can it be said
that the defendants acted in bad faith.in signing the lien
waiver in exchange for the $700.00 paid by contractor
Holmes to apply upon his open account which then
reflected a balance. of approximately $3900.00.. rrhis is
not a case of fraud. The plaintiffs were well aware tha.t
liohnes was a general contractor and that he had several
other dwelling jobs under construction at the time plaintiff:-; e1nployed 4im (R. 46 & 47). They trusted him as
tlwir agent to vvithdra\v funds fr<;>nl .their loaning institution a~ lien \vaiver-s were presented (Defendants'
1 1 ~xhibit 1). rrhe defendants 'had sold building n1aterials
to 1-Iohne~ to be used on the several jobs at his discretion,
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and as previously stated, he was indebted to the defendants in excess of $3900.00 when he Inade the $700.00 payment on his·. account. . This money can1e from the bank
account o.f Holmes and not from the loan account of the
plaintiffs as the Union Trust Company named Hohnes
only, as payee. The plaintiffs claim defendants were
negligent when they executed the lien waiver, or that
they· were unjustly enriched and ought in good conscience, return the money. Neither of these propositions
is tenable.
What did the defendants do wrong when they executed the lien ·waiver~ This was merely the giving up
of a right which was created for their _benefit under the
mechanics' lien statute. Waiver is the relinquishment of
or refusal to accept a right. It i1nplies an election of the
party ·to forego some advantage which he Inight have
had. Words and Phrases, Volume 44, Page 516. .As i~
said by the author in 57 Corpus Juris Secundun1, paragraph 222, ·p-age 793 : ·
"The waiver of a mechanics' lien is not the
giving up of a property right, but Inerely of an
added remedy."
Upon the theory adopted and pursued by the plaintiffs in their co1nplaint and at the trial, and defendants
ai~e charged 'with negligence. Can it be said that there
was a duty owing fro1n the defendants to the plaintiff~!
If so, 'vhat was that duty? .N egligenre is a relative tel'ln
and ·its application de vends on the situation of the
parties, and the degree of care and vigilance 'vhirh the
16
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circ.tunstances reasonably iiupose. The first requisite in
establishing negligence is to show the existence of the
duty 'vhich it is supposed has not been performed. There
can be no negligence unless there is a duty which has
been violated. The afore quoted 1nechanics' lien statute
(Title 38-1-3), iinposed no duty up~on the defendants
except to refrain froin activities which would amount
to collusion with plaintiffs' contractor, and hence result
in fraud. ..A. s before stated, this is not a case of fraud
and the plaintiffs have never so contended. The Inaterials were furnished in good faith to Hohnes. He was the
agent of the plaintiffs and by the provisions of the
letter of instructions given by the plaintiffs to their loaning institution (Defendants' Exhibit 1), Holmes had-control of the situation and could draw funds upon .the
presentation of lien 'Yaivers, wholly within the discretion
of the l!nion Trust Company. It even went so far as to
release the loan coinpany from any liability in connection
with the payinents. s.uppose the defendants didn't keep
an account of where the 1naterials sold to Holmes were
eventually used. T'here was no duty owing to plaintiffs
in that respect and when the defendant, H. r~r. Cope,
signed the lien waiver in blank, except for the date and
a1nount received, and returned it by mail to Holmes, he
relied wholly upon the knowl.edge of the contractor who
\vas· plaintiffs' agent and assumed to know the true
facts of where the n1a terials had been used. The evidence
shows flohnes was counuingling his building 1naterials
aiHl e\ren had he told defendants where the materials·
purcha~ed fro111 t.heu1 'vere going to be used, this wouldn't
17
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ha.ve· made any. difference, as the n1aterials could have
~asily been 1no~ed to other jobs. Both plai_ntiffs and
:1efendants_ lost .bY tP.e bankruptcy of Holmes, but the
pl~intiffs. could. have protected themselves by insisting
upon a contractors' performance bond as provided by
law, or by periodic investigations to see that the
~aterials purchased by their contractor actually went
into. the construction of their dwelling. Nmnerous cases
have been decided by the courts concerning the application of statutes ·pertaining to mechanics' liens. However, the- decisions are largely concerned with the burden
of proof required on the part of a materialman to prove
a claimed lien, which is not our instant case. The instant
problen1 is considered in 57 Corpus Juris Secundmn,
paragraph 249, at page 827, wherein the author says:
"In the absence of fraud and collusion, <~
materialman receiving fron1 a contractor 1noney
paid over by the owner rnay apply such payn1ent
to any debts owed hirn by the contractor."
We believe the case of Bounds vs. Nuttle, 30 Atlantie
2d 263, 181 Maryland 400, is precisely in point. In passing upon facts similar to our instant case, the court said:
"Contractors building a nurnber of houses
frequently have separate account~ with rnaterial
rnen. · The contractor can apply hi~ n1oney on any
.bill he ow.es ... It does not have to be applied on the
. bill for the rnaterials for .the hou~e fro1n the eontract· for which he obtained it. r:I~he ('Oll t ra<'t or\~
obligation to the 0\\7ner i~ to furnish and turn oYt·r
the house \\~ithout liens, but this does not })}'<'YPnt
18
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hiin fron1 using his receipts fro In one con tract to
pay on another. Nor does it prevent the material
1nan fron1 having his lien, unles·s he agrees that
it shall be done this \vay, in order tha.t he may
get his other bills paid and 1na.y collect double
fro In the owner. That, of course, would be fraud."'
The court goes on to say:
If the failure to protect themselves against
an i1npecunious contractor causes them to have to
pay twice for Inaterials, it is their own fault. The
1nechanics' lien law was passed to cover just such
a situation -and to protect materialmen. The
· theory of it is that the owner gets the benefit of
the n1aterials, and he has control of the money. If
he negligently and carelessly pays the money out
to the contractor .without taking precautions to
see that it is applied to the payment of the materials which go into the building, then he must stand
the loss rather than the materialman, who has no.
opportunity to protect himself once he has delivered the materials."
H

As is said by the author in 40 Corpus Juris, paragraph 464, page 344 :
~·The

right of a contractor, materialman, or
workman to a lien is ·not dependent upon the state
of accounts between the owner and contractor, and
hence the lien is not defeated or affected by any
pay1nent to the contractor."
Even where one performs labor for part of which
he is entitled to a 1nechanics' lien, and for part of which
he is not entitled to such lien, he 1na-y, on payments being
tuade 'vithout specifying which account they are to be
credited to, appropriate then1 to either account. Christ1~ot
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Montana Gold and Silver llfining Company, 1 1\Iontana. 44.

'VS.

It is the duty of the owner, in paying his contractor,
to see that funds are properly distributed to laborers,
rnaterialmen, and subcontractors. General Sports Co-mP.~'f!:Y vs .. Lesli.e and Walter Coo1nbs Lumber Co1npany,
288 Pac. 949, 143 Oklahoma 297. See also Georgia State
Savirn.gs Association vs. Swn Lu1nber Con~pany, 280 Pac.
281, 138 Oklahoma 11, wherein the court said:
. "A 1nateriahnan is not ordinarily required
to apply payments made by owner to any specific
account or debt unless so directed."
Schwager.- Nettleton Mills vs. Carstens, 180 Pac.
137, 106 Washington 392.

Bannock L~~m.ber ·and Coal Company vs. Tribune
Company, Ltd.,et al. 4 Pac. 2d 663.
Applying the foregoing principles, we respectfully
submit that the plaintiffs cannot recover the a1nount
paid by their contractor to the defendants, neither upon
the theory of negligence, as relied upon by them in their
cornplaint, nor upon a money had and received count.
rrhe gist of an action for llloney had and received is that
a \vrongdoer has .deprived a person of the· possession of
property or money to which he is entitled and for which
r~coyery or compensation is sought. .A.~ .is said in 7
Co1~pus _Juris ~ecun~un_1, paragraph 9, page 115:
""In one word, the gi~t of this kind of aetion
is that the defendant, upon the eir<'Ulllstances of
20
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the ra~e, is obliged by the ties of natural justice
and equity to refund the n1oney."
and in paragraph -l, page 111 of the srune voluine, the
author further says :
''The action of assu1npsit, as the derivation
of the word in1plies, is founded on an undertaking
or promise, and the courts have frequently and
repeatedly stated that a contract, express or
i1nplied, is necessary to support it."
\Ve fail to see w·here the plaintiffs in our instant
case could prevail even though they had set forth in their
con1plaint an action in assumpsit for money had and
received. The defendants are not wrongdoers. As previously stated, it was not plaintiffs' money which th~y
received fron1 Holmes and applied to his account. The
money caine from Hohnes on October 27, 1950, and the
1noney paid to hin1 from plaintiffs' loan account was on·
Nove1nber 3, 1950, so1ne six days later. A~ is said in
Jl:lou.rant vs. Pullman Tt·ust and Savings Bank,' ·(Ill.) 41
N. E. 2d 1006:
."A party cannot make his own infraction of .
his agreement the basis of an action for money
hand and received against the other party who
stands innocent."
Even though the plaintiffs suffered an unfortunate
lOHH due to the bankruptcy of Jlohnes, we do not believe
they are entitled to recover 1nerely because it 1night
<tppear generally fajr that recoup1nent of their 1noney
~hould he afforded fro1n son1e source. We ~gain quote
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·frorn 58 Corpus Juris Secundurn, paragraph 5, page 915,
:what- ·we believe to be the principle applicable to our
instant situation:
"An action for n1oney had and received \\Till
. li~ to recover 1noney that had been paid by plaintiff to defendan.t for a consideration which ha~
wholly failed unless the failure of consideration
is shown to be attributable to sorne fault on the
part of plaintiff himself."
The plaintiffs by their own careless acts rnade it
possible for Holmes to pay his creditors as he selected.
;The~e was no privity between plaintiffs and defendants
.and there .was certainly no unjust enrich1nent on the
part .of the defendants nor was the pay1nent received
from Holmes without consideration having been given.
In support of our contentions, we again quote fron1 58
Corpus Juris Secundum, paragraph 13, page 922:
"The action for rnoney had and receiyed
ordinarily cannot be maintained against one who
has received rnoney . under a claim of right in
ignorance of its true ownership, as where n1oney
wrongfully taken or diverted frorn the plaintiff
was received by the defendant in good faith fro1n
the wrongdoer in the ordinary course of busine~s
or ·for payment of an antecedent debt. The test
is· honesty and, good faith on the part of fht
receiver of the money and not his dirigcncf'.''
.~nd

in 4 ·Am~rican Juris prudence, page 512, note 9:
"To recover in an action for 1noney had and
received, there n1ust be ~orne priYi t~· behrePn the
22
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o'vner and receiver, or 1nala fides, or unjust
receipt, or, at least, receipt without valuable
consideration."
..~.\.t

the risk of being repetitions, ";'e desire to elnpha~ize that defendants in no 'vay knowingly contributed to
plaintiffs loss. Quite to the contrary. The defendants
honestly believed their Ina terials 'vere used by Holmes
in the plaintiff's d'velling, and there was no reason to
believe or suspect that the Inateria.ls hadn't been. Holmes
'vas a reputable contractor and was trusted by the plain-·
tiffs in the withdra 'val of funds from the loaning institution. .To require 1naterialn1en to follow materials
after they have once been delivered to a contractor would
place an unreasonable and intolerable burden and
restaint upon their business. We respectfully conclude
that the trial Court erred in entering judgment upon
any theory in favor of the plaintiffs and that the judgInent should be reversed.

POINT IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE
PRE-TRIAL ORDER AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFFS' CASE ON THE GROUND AND FOR THE REASON
THAT SUCH AMENDMENT CREATED AN ENTIRELY NEW
THEORY OF THE CASE AND WAS FATAL TO PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTIO!'r.

\Vhile w.e do not believe that the plaintiffs are
entitled to recover on the n1erits in this action, we do
dl~:'i re to di~eus~ the 1natter of an1endment of the pre-
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trial order as suggested and per1nitted by the trial Court
after. th·e plaintiffs had rested. It is our i1npression that
once t~e plaintiffs elected to proceed on· the basis of
negligence in to.rt, that even if they may have had a good
cause of action in. assuinpsit, which in t.he instant case
we 'claim· they had not, their election' would be binding
and· they could not change their position and adopt an
entirely new theory after all of their evidence had been
presented and they had rested. As is said in Page on
The Law of Contracts, -,{olume 3, paragraph 1504, page
2571:
"Since the doctrine of suing in implied contract upon a tort is really a case of election of
remedies, the election of one re1nedy 'vhen c·oinplete bars the other."
The ·same rule is recognized and followed in 7 A1nerican
Juris prudence, paragraph 22, page 123 :
_"The general rule is that the declaration 1nu~t
contain a direct allegation of a promise hy defendant. Either an express promise should be alleged,
or the facts from which it may be i1nplied, otherwise the complaint will be fatally defective."
arid in the same Volum-e, paragraph 26 c:

.

"Variance -

F'ollowing the rules governing
civii actions generally,· in assu1npsit the proof
n1ust conf'or1n to the pleadings. It is not enough
that the evidence 1nay sho\V a cause of action; it
n1ust show the cause of action pleaded."
The Court's attention is also respectfully invitPd to f>~
Corpus .Juris Secundu1n, paragraph 30 P (3):
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A. 1naterial variance between pleadings and

H .•

proof in an action for n1oney had and received is
fatal to a recovery. Objection that there is a
yariance n1ay be raised by motion for non-suit."
\Vhile we recognize that the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure conte1nplate a liberal construction of pleadings and grant to the trial courts wide latitude in perrnl.tting a1nendlnents to conforin to the proof, we do not
believe that the funda1nentals of pleading have entirely
been abrogated. It is generally recognized that _an
amendment 1nay not be permitted where the effect ·of
such amend1nent is to state another and distinct cause
of action. An a1nendment presupposes a change in something existing, not a substitution of something else for
that which has been pleaded. We respectfully submit
that the trial court should have granted defendants'
1notion for dis1nissal on this ground alone. because of
the variance between plaintiffs proof and pleadings and
the inconsistan t theory of their action.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully_ submit that the j-udgment of the
trial Court should be reversed with directions to enter
judgn1ent in favor of the defendants and against. the
plaintiffs, no cause of action, and for costs.
Respectfully subn1itted,

F. ROBERT BAYLE,
.Attorney for Defendants
and .l!ppellants.
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